I. INTRODUCTION
According to many environmental advocates, traditional methods of assessing ecological and human health risks associated with environmental policies, synthetic chemicals, and agricultural technologies have fallen short. On their view, these methods have failed to adequately protect humans and ecosystems because they presuppose, based on limited evidence, that various policies and technologies are safe, when in fact the risks are not fully known. The precautionary principle often is seen as an alternative to these failures. This principle emphasizes that precautionary measures should be taken, or at least considered, in instances where human activities raise threats to human or environmental health, even when the nature and magnitude of these threats are uncertain.
Although intuitively appealing, the precautionary principle has been widely criticized as vague, irrational, or incoherent. 1 Formulations of the principle are diverse: some versions emphasize the idea that uncertainty should not be taken as a reason to ignore risks or postpone measures to reduce them; other versions stress the need to take action to reduce health and environmental risks even when the nature and magnitude of the risks are uncertain or not clearly established. 2 Considered in isolation from the historical and sociopolitical context in which it arose, the precautionary principle does seem odd: why should we pay special attention to unknown or unestablished risks, especially when there are likely benefits in sight? For instance, why postpone the introduction of genetically modified plants that will generate higher crop yields, or that can deliver vitamins to nutritionally deprived populations, on the speculation that there could be some unintended side effects? Is the precautionary principle utterly irrational?
Perhaps not. This is not to say that the principle is clear, unambiguous, or unproblematic. However, it does attempt to respond to some real problems with traditional risk assessment. Most notably, many risk assessment techniques focus on a narrow set of risks, such as long-term cancer risk or acute risks associated with ingestion of high concentrations of a particular chemical. 3 Advocates of the precautionary principle argue that such approaches may fail to account for chronic human health effects other than cancer and overlook effects on nonhuman health and the environment more broadly. Thus, there are prima facie reasons to take seriously the precautionary principle, insofar as it better acknowledges such potential risks.
It is also worth noting that the principle has been incorporated into a wide range of environmental policy statements, including the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, and the 1992 Treaty on European Union. 4 The City of San Francisco has enshrined it into law. 5 Because it is both controversial and diversely formulated, the precautionary principle deserves careful philosophical analysis. This analysis may lead not only to a better theoretical understanding of the principle, but also to a more coherent, tractable, and defensible formulation of it-or alternatively, to replacement of the principle with a better approach. The particular focus of this paper is on the distinction between doing and allowing. I seek to understand whether a prominent version of the precautionary principle rests in any important sense on this distinction, and if so, whether the distinction has a legitimate role in environmental policy. 6 Frances Howard-Snyder, "Doing vs. Allowing Harm," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/doing/allowing/#9. 7 Of course, the fact that the doing/allowing distinction informs environmental positions and policies does not show that it should.
II. THE DOING/ALLOWING DISTINCTION
The doing/allowing distinction is a familiar one in moral philosophy. The basic idea is that it is worse to do harm than to allow harm to occur. Thus, it is worse to kill a person than to fail to save him or her from death, even when one could easily do so. The surgeon who stabs a patient to death in the emergency room commits a graver moral wrong than the surgeon who nonchalantly finishes his cigarette and coffee while the heart attack victim lies dying on the gurney. Both actions are morally wrong, but the stabbing is worse.
The principled basis for the doing/allowing distinction is controversial. One recent commentator suggests that rather than describe a single difference, the doing/allowing distinction actually points to a family of distinctions. 6 The primary version of the doing/allowing distinction that I explore involves the distinction between risks that persons generate through their actions (anthropogenic risks) and risks that persons do not generate through their actions (nonanthropogenic risks).
III. THE ROLE OF THE DOING/ALLOWING DISTINCTION IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Many environmental policies seem to rest on an implicit distinction between doing and allowing. For example, most people think it worse to drive a species to extinction than to fail to save a species that is declining through no fault of ours, and worse to pollute the air with chemicals that trigger asthma attacks than to fail to remove naturally occurring allergens such as pollen and mold, which can have similar effects. In addition, the distinction informs certain views of how to treat environmental risks. According to many environmentalists, it is worse to introduce a new environmental risk-say, from a pesticide or genetically modified crop-than to accept the risks associated with the postponement of such technologies. 7 The doing/allowing distinction shows up prominently in discussions of global climate change. Discussants of climate change typically distinguish between anthropogenic and nonanthropogenic change, and this distinction influences environmental policy goals. When representatives met in 1992 to establish the Framework Convention on Climate Change, they articulated the following aim: "The ultimate objective of this Convention . . . is to achieve . . . stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. . . ." 8 Why does the word anthropogenic appear in this statement? If in fact anthropogenic adds content here, it is because we think there is something significant about human-caused environmental problems that makes them worse, or at least deserving of greater attention, than problems that naturally arise. Indeed, much debate over global climate change and what to do about it has hinged on whether it is human caused. The Bush Administration, for example, for many years insisted that although climate change is occurring, it may not be the result of human activity. At one press conference, President Bush made this comment: "[F]irst of all . . . the globe is warming. The fundamental debate: Is it man-made or natural. . . ." 9 On what basis might one maintain that the fundamental debate over climate change rests on whether we have or have not caused it? Should we take a different moral attitude and policy approach toward damage to the environment caused by humans than toward environmental harms not caused by us?
IV. THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND ANTHROPOGENIC VS. NONANTHROPOGENIC RISKS At least one prominent version of the precautionary principle answers this last question in the affirmative. The Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle, formulated at a conference convened in 1998 by the Science and Environmental Health Network, suggests that we give special attention to the avoidance of human-caused harm to the environment and human health. The statement reads:
The release and use of toxic substances, the exploitation of resources, and physical alterations of the environment have had substantial unintended consequences affecting human health and the environment. Some of these concerns are high rates of learning deficiencies, asthma, cancer, birth defects and species extinctions; along with global climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion and worldwide contamination with toxic substances and nuclear materials.
We believe existing environmental regulations and other decisions, particularly those based on risk assessment, have failed to protect adequately human health and the environment-the larger system of which humans are but a part.
We believe there is compelling evidence that damage to humans and the worldwide environment is of such magnitude and seriousness that new principles for conducting human activities are necessary.
While we realize that human activities may involve hazards, people must proceed more carefully than has been the case in recent history. Corporations, government entities, organizations, communities, scientists and other individuals must adopt a precautionary approach to all human endeavors. 
DOING, ALLOWING, AND PRECAUTION
There are a number of key features of the Wingspread formulation of the precautionary principle. First, it emphasizes human-caused risks. Second, it highlights past failures to account for those risks. Third, it emphasizes the need for protective action, even in the absence of scientific documentation and quantification of risks. Lastly, it criticizes traditional risk assessment as deficient, on the basis that it has "failed to protect adequately human health and the environment."
One question that advocates of the Wingspread principle must face is this: on what basis is it superior to other responses to risk? One might grant that risks to human health and the environment have been overlooked in the past, that traditional risk assessment is overly narrow and leads to underestimation of key risks, and that protective actions are sometimes needed under conditions of uncertainty. Yet, even conceding these points, one might reject the precautionary principle. In particular, one might argue that it is irrational to place extra weight on human-caused risks to health and the environment; instead, we should be concerned to minimize overall risk. On this line of reasoning, it is no worse to die of lung cancer caused by secondhand smoke than it is to die of lung cancer caused by naturally occurring radon: if you're sick, you're sick, and if you're dead, you're dead. If the most effective way to reduce cancer and increase life expectancy is to control nonanthropogenic sources of lung cancer rather than anthropogenic ones, we ought to focus on the former. Anthropogenic causes are not necessarily worse than nonanthropogenic ones. What makes one cause worse than another is the magnitude of the harm it generates.
This objection to the precautionary principle comes from the perspective of risk trade-off analysis, an approach developed by John Graham and Jonathan Wiener. 11 The overarching goal of risk trade-off analysis is to minimize net risk, whatever its source. Thus, the approach makes no distinction between anthropogenic and nonanthropogenic risks. Wiener notes that risk trade-off analysis is not specifically focused on denying the anthropogenic/nonanthropogenic distinction with respect to risk 12 ; however, this denial seems a clear entailment of the position. Risk trade-off analysis's central point is that controlling some risks may leave us exposed to others, and countervailing effects need to be taken into account. For example, a single-minded focus on anthropogenic risk reduction may make us more vulnerable to nonanthropogenic risk, and emphasizing 13 Careful allocation of risk reduction effort is particularly important if reduction of a given risk involves diminishing marginal returns. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point.
14 See, e.g., Wiener, "Precaution in a Multirisk World." By "strong versions" of the precautionary principle, I mean versions that stress the need for precautionary action in the face of uncertain threats. Wiener suggests that weaker versions, which hold that "uncertainty does not justify inaction" (p. 1514), are relatively innocuous.
15 Jonathan Wiener, personal communication.
the prospective risks of new technologies may leave us vulnerable to risks that these technologies have the potential to reduce. 13 Both Graham and Wiener are critical of strong versions of the precautionary principle, which, they suggest, attend to some risks while overlooking others. 14 A key worry, therefore, is that the precautionary principle irrationally focuses attention on certain classes of risks, rather than taking a broad and comprehensive view that weighs all risks. This is not the only response to the precautionary principle that advocates of risk trade-off analysis have offered, however. Wiener also has argued that insofar as the principle seeks to reduce overall risk, it is in line with risk tradeoff analysis, and in fact adds nothing new to it. 15 This is a deflationary response, suggesting that the precautionary principle is just a muddled way of advocating the very same thing that proponents of risk trade-off analysis recommend.
V. A DILEMMA FOR THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
The risk-trade-off-analysis-inspired objections to the precautionary principle can be framed as a dilemma that goes as follows: the precautionary principle is either irrational or empty.
The first horn of the dilemma is that the precautionary principle is irrational. The Wingspread version of the precautionary principle demands that we place extra weight on uncertain environmental and human health harms that our activities might cause. But why weigh certain kinds of harms and benefits more heavily than others? And why place special weight on uncertain harms? The rational thing to do would be to weigh all costs and benefits, with appropriate consideration of risks, then decide on the basis of that all-things-considered calculation. In effect, the precautionary principle recommends that we irrationally overvalue environmental and human health risks associated with human activities and irrationally undervalue the potential benefits of new technologies (which may reduce risks) for human welfare.
The second horn of the dilemma is that the precautionary principle is empty. Suppose the defender of the precautionary principle denies the irrationality charge, arguing that the precautionary principle does not place extra weight on certain kinds of harms and benefits. Then, says the defender of risk trade-off analysis, the precautionary principle does not add anything new to existing approaches to decision making. The precautionary principle just instructs us to 16 I rely on the following definition of direct consequentialism: "[W]hether an act is morally right depends only on the consequences of that act itself (as opposed to the consequences of the agent's motive, of a rule or practice that covers other acts of the same kind, and so on make sure to include human-caused risks to the environment and human health in our calculations. But advocates of the risk trade-off analysis approach do not deny this point: in fact, considering all the risks is just what they recommend. So the precautionary principle is empty as a guide to decision making that is supposed to supplement or replace existing approaches.
To summarize, either the precautionary principle recommends direct consequentialism 16 regarding risks or it does not. If the precautionary principle recommends direct consequentialism, then it is no different from risk trade-off analysis: both approaches emphasize the minimization of risk. If the precautionary principle does not endorse direct consequentialism, it is irrational. Thus, precautionary principle is either empty or irrational.
VI. A CONSEQUENTIALIST REPLY TO THE DILEMMA?
Suppose we accept the basic premise of the dilemma, that the precautionary principle is either a direct consequentialist 17 approach to risk or it is not. We can still deny the conclusion by rejecting one or both conditionals. Take the question of emptiness first. Recall that this horn of the dilemma holds that if the precautionary principle takes a consequentialist approach to risk, it adds nothing to, and is no different than, risk trade-off analysis. So the key question is this: if the precautionary principle is consequentialist, is it simply risk tradeoff analysis by another name?
Not necessarily. It is not clear that "direct consequentialism" specifies a single approach embodied in risk trade-off analysis, and that all direct consequentialist approaches reduce to risk trade-off analysis. Consequentialism is complex. Theoretically, direct consequentialism demands that we consider all (and only) the consequences of a potential action. But how are we to understand "all the consequences"? Are we to include any consequence, however remote? 18 What conditions determine whether something is to count as a consequence? Consequentialists must take stands on these issues, and in doing so, they carve out positions that can diverge from one another in important respects. Consequentialists face challenges both in defining consequences and in measuring consequences. They face problems involving future persons and possible persons, and of total consequences versus per capita consequences. Risk, It is difficult to pinpoint an in-principle difference between risk trade-off analysis and the precautionary principle when both are interpreted as direct consequentialist approaches. Differences of this kind are more likely to be seen in application rather than theory. 23 Even if the dilemma can be answered in this way, it doesn't fully vindicate the precautionary principle. Risk trade-off analysis might still be a better consequentialist approach.
Thus, "direct consequentialism" is not as straightforward as it might seem, and any direct consequentialist approach to risk must specify and bound its consideration of consequences. One way to respond to this horn of the dilemma is to argue that the precautionary principle and risk trade-off analysis are both direct consequentialist approaches, but that they differently bound the consequences to be considered. The precautionary principle calls our attention to consequences and alternatives not included in traditional approaches to risk assessment. 19 Precautionary approaches emphasize longer time horizons and broader and more uncertain effects (not just effects on humans, but on nonhuman animals and plants, or on the environment more broadly) than traditional risk assessments. Risk trade-off analysis, too, might be broader than traditional risk assessment, but perhaps in a different way. Advocates of risk trade-off analysis tend to be concerned with the ways in which regulation can fail by shifting risks from one realm to another (while failing to reduce risk overall), or by foregoing benefits when a new technology is blocked. 20 Risk trade-off analysis draws attention to the downsides of reducing a target risk, 21 and to the potential positive effects of innovation. By emphasizing net risk, risk trade-off analysis is willing to countenance increased risks of certain kinds if outweighed by greater risk reductions elsewhere. The precautionary principle, on the other hand, seems less accepting of such trade-offs: it seems more focused on avoiding bad consequences than on weighing good versus bad. 22 So there is at least a prima facie case that both the precautionary principle and the risk trade-off analysis approach could be consequentialist without reducing to the same thing. One reply to the dilemma, therefore, suggests that the precautionary principle is directly consequentialist, but not empty in relation to risk trade-off analysis because the precautionary principle differently bounds consideration of consequences. 23 Yet, my central concern in this paper is with the possibility that the precautionary principle is not straightforwardly consequentialist, and this possibility brings us back to the other horn of the dilemma and the charge of irrationality. If the precautionary principle does have non-consequentialist elements, is it 24 See, e.g., Samuel Scheffler, ed., Consequentialism and its Critics (New York: Oxford, 1988 necessarily irrational? On one hand, it is difficult to deny that environmental policies should aim to produce the best consequences overall, to maximize human welfare and minimize environmental damage. Yet, consequentialism is not unassailable. Moral philosophers have long been divided over the merits of the approach. 24 So even if the precautionary principle is not fully consequentialist, it may represent a rational approach to environmental policy. In the next section, I explore the possibility that the precautionary principle has a deontological component, and specifically that this deontological component is tied to some version of the distinction between doing and allowing.
VII. A SECOND REPLY: THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ANTHROPOGENIC AND NONANTHROPOGENIC RISK
There is at least one important respect in which risk trade-off analysis and the precautionary principle differ, and this difference suggests that whereas risk trade-off analysis is fully consequentialist, the precautionary principle is not. The difference lies in the two approaches' respective treatment of anthropogenic versus nonanthropogenic risks. The precautionary principle stresses the dangers of human activities and human-caused environmental harm, while risk trade-off analysis tends to downplay the anthropogenic/nonanthropogenic distinction, instead emphasizing overall risk and highlighting countervailing benefits of certain "harmful" human activities, such as the generation of particulate pollution. Discussing global environmental protection, for example, Jonathan Wiener argues that particulate pollution may not be an unmitigated environmental "bad," since the sulfur pollution produced by burning coal reflects solar radiation away from the earth, mitigating the warming effect of greenhouse gases. 25 Similarly, Wiener argues that low-level (tropospheric) ozone-the main ingredient in urban smog-may have a beneficial effect in shielding people from cancer-causing UV radiation, despite the damage it causes to the respiratory system, to forests, and to agricultural production. 26 He writes, "At least some locales will need to face the question whether the protection from UV . . . that is afforded by ground-level ozone could make it worthwhile to tolerate the increased lung, crop, and forest ailments." 27 Wiener's analysis places little weight on the distinction between anthropogenic and nonanthropogenic risk, and he treats anthropogenic risks and anthropogenic benefits symmetrically: a "harmful" human activity may be acceptable or desirable if it generates side benefits that outweigh the harm. 33 Wiener does acknowledge that emphasizing human adaptation may leave ecosystems or nonhuman species at risk, entailing a "risk transfer" that needs to be considered. See his "Protecting the Global Environment," p. 223.
Following these same lines, Wiener's discussion of global climate change highlights not only the risks of anthropogenic climate change to human health and the environment, but also the potential benefits. Wiener notes, for example, that climate warming may have beneficial effects on agricultural production in certain parts of the world, and that preventing global warming may expose us to risks associated with natural climate cooling. 28 Summarizing his discussion of climate change, he comments:
As for the choice between a warmer world and a colder world, risk trade-off analysis suggests that the goal should not be framed in terms of a "stable climate." . . . We know that the earth's climate varies perpetually and considerably, even on human time scales . . . mostly for reasons that humanity appears powerless to control. . . . Perhaps a better formulation would be to manage our own emissions of trace gases toward an "optimal anthropogenic contribution" or an "optimal atmospheric composition." Then, given the constant dynamism of the climate and the importance of short-term as well as longer-term climate variations to human welfare, a key goal should be increasing the ability of societies to adapt to changing climate. 29 This view can be understood in the context of Wiener's other writings, where he explicitly rejects the idea that there is a "balance of nature" that should be preserved, and argues that the new, dynamic ecology destroys any meaningful sense of the word natural. Because nature is always changing, "the term 'natural' has no objective referent": it is a social construct. 30 Wiener also rejects the distinction between doing and allowing, noting that "[b]ecause species (including humans) interact in complex ways, there is no such thing as 'noninterference'; noninterference is interference of a different sort." 31 This helps explain why, for Wiener, the central issue surrounding climate change is not whether humans have caused it, 32 but rather, how we can move toward an optimal climate while at the same time enhancing our (and perhaps other organisms' and ecosystems' 33 ) ability to adapt to unwelcome changes.
Although it may not always be easy to distinguish acts from omissions, or interference from noninterference, these distinctions do seem to underlie the Wingspread statement. This and related versions of the precautionary principle 34 See United Kingdom Interdepartmental Liaison Group on Risk Assessment, "The Precautionary Principle: Policy and Application," http://www.hse.gov.uk/aboutus/meetings/ilgra/ pppa.htm (emphasis added).
35 Insofar as inaction is viewed as a proposed human activity that creates risk, a government's failure to protect people from natural hazards could fall within the ambit of the precautionary principle. However, this is not typically how the version of the precautionary principle considered here is understood and applied, and queries of Academic Search Premier for "precautionary principle AND natural hazards," "precautionary principle AND flood" and "precautionary principle AND earthquake" turned up no results. 36 This case is a complex one: the prevalence of malaria itself may be significantly influenced by human activities. Recent research suggests that malarial mosquitoes may thrive in deforested and human-disturbed areas. See, e. emphasize proposed human activities that pose risks and recommend shifting of the burden of proof from the regulator (e.g., the government) to "the hazard creator." 34 Clearly, the burden-of-proof requirement makes sense only if the hazard creator is an agent of some sort: the natural environment cannot be asked to refrain from operating in a certain way until it demonstrates the lack of risk associated with such operations. As such, the precautionary principle calls particular attention to the wrongness of doing harm to human health or the environment, but does not explicitly prohibit the allowing of harm. Thus, the precautionary principle does not demand that individuals, corporations, or governments take special precautions to protect people or the environment from naturally occurring risks. Only if an activity of one of these parties would increase risk exposure does the precautionary principle come into play. So, if a town decided to build a poorly ventilated school in a high radon area, thereby exposing schoolchildren to high levels of radon and elevated risks of lung cancer, then the precautionary principle would kick in; but the precautionary principle doesn't directly demand that municipalities protect people from natural hazards. 35 In instances where DDT application is suggested as a control measure for malaria, the precautionary principle would recommend an assessment of less toxic alternatives to DDT and-if DDT is used-the employment of precautionary measures to limit risks to human health and the environment. However, the precautionary principle doesn't seem to mandate any particular action to control malaria, at least insofar as malaria is not human caused. 36 In some situations, this asymmetry seems to make sense. We can't reasonably expect others to protect us from all the natural risks in the world; a morality that required doing so would be overly demanding. But in other situations, the asymmetry seems odd. Isn't it just as unconscionable to let children die of malaria without any preventative intervention as it is to harm humans or the environment through the use of DDT?
This issue brings a number of critical questions into focus: what kind of justification might there be for the asymmetrical treatment of human-caused versus nonanthropogenic risk? Why place extra emphasis on human-caused risks, when people face all sorts of serious threats to their health and well being from natural pathogens and natural disasters?
One reply offered by proponents of the precautionary principle is this:
We must deal with the hazards for which we are responsible and over which we have control. Those creating risk and benefiting from their activities also have an obligation not to cause harm. But an important reason for precaution is that we do not yet know, and may never know, the full extent of the harm caused by human activity. Some violent natural events, for example, may be a result of global warming, which in turn is linked to human activity. 37 On the view expressed here, the precautionary principle emphasizes avoidance of (1) harms we cause (or are considering causing) and (2) harms we can control. The first category of harms figures centrally in the doing/allowing distinction; the second category, however, does not. In fact, examples of the distinction often attempt to hold this second variable constant, comparing situations in which a doing and an allowing are similarly straightforward to control. Such examples include cases where it is quite easy to save someone from death-the saving is fully controllable by the agent-to show that the moral difference maker is causation rather than ability to control. In the case of the emergency room doctor above, the doctor who calmly finishes his cigarette while the heart attack victim dies potentially has quite a bit of control over whether the patient lives or dies, but he (arguably) does not directly cause the death, in contrast to his murderous counterpart who stabs the patient. It is frequently the case that we can control both anthropogenic and nonanthropogenic risks. In fact, in some instances it may be easier to control the latter, and there may be no robust correlation between a risk's controllability and its being human caused. So, although it may make sense to focus our energies on risks we can control (lest we exert effort to no good effect), controllability itself provides insufficient justification for focusing on anthropogenic risks.
Even if human-caused risks are not more controllable than natural risks, however, there may be important reasons to pay special attention to risks that we cause. I want to call attention to two kinds of reasons: reasons tied to common conceptions of fairness and moral responsibility, which are of a deontological hue, and indirect consequentialist reasons based in empirical generalizations about anthropogenic versus nonanthropogenic risks. 38 Michael R. Reich, "The Global Drug Gap," Science 287 (2000): 1979-81. 39 "Furor on Memo at World Bank," New York Times, 7 February1992. The memo notoriously notes: "A given amount of health-impairing pollution should be done in the country with the lowest cost, which will be the country with the lowest wages."
DEONTOLOGICAL REASONS FOR PRECAUTION IN RELATION TO ANTHROPOGENIC RISKS
Fairness. One reason to be especially concerned about human-caused risks is because these risks can be the source of unfairness. Fairness is fundamentally tied to questions of equality, equity, and distribution. For example, it is unfair if Susan's little brother Tom eats the whole cake, leaving her none, because Tom has taken more than his share. Shares of the cake should be apportioned equitably. Similarly, in the environmental arena, it is unfair if we disproportionately burden poor and minority communities with pollution and toxic waste. Although fairness may not require absolute equality in shares of a particular harm or good, on common conceptions, fairness requires that distributions reflect equal moral consideration for all persons.
The introduction of anthropogenic risks raises questions of fairness because such risks often are distributed inequitably. For example, risks associated with the use of pesticides on agricultural crops typically fall disproportionately on farm workers, and risks associated with lead paint fall disproportionately on the young, who are more sensitive to the effects of lead and more likely to ingest lead-laden dust and paint chips. Human activities that introduce health and environmental risks may generate unfairness, even if these activities reduce overall risk; thus, issues of fairness are not fully accounted for by direct consequentialism.
Even if a particular human activity promises to reduce risk in the aggregate, it may unfairly shift risks from one population to another. What's more, the activities of profit-driven organizations (manufacturers, corporations, etc.) in general tend to transfer risks from the wealthy to the poor. Corporations make profits by creating products consumed by those who can afford to buy them; thus, economic incentives motivate corporations to generate benefits for the wealthy, sometimes at the expense of the poor. The distribution of disease research and drug development, for example, is strongly skewed toward diseases that affect the wealthy, while diseases such as malaria, endemic in less-developed countries, receive relatively little attention. 38 With respect to the environment, similar incentives exist: recall Lawrence Summers' infamous memo about the economic benefits of sending toxic waste to the Third World. 39 Perhaps this approach would be economically efficient. One might even imagine (though I doubt it's true) that the approach would reduce the overall risks to human health and the environment, and hence be favored by some 40 Here one might object that I am using common moral intuitions as the basis for normative claims; yet, these intutions may be wrong. I accede this point. However, insofar as there are some widely held and reflectively endorsed intuitions that the precautionary principle can account for better than a direct consequentialist approach, this may be taken as a point in its favor. 41 Direct consequentialists would, of course, deny that this is a virtue, holding instead that our everyday thinking about fairness is misguided.
42 By taking a holistic approach to risk, risk trade-off analysis, too, may take into account fairness issues more thoroughly than traditional risk assessment (though not in exactly the same way as the precautionary principle). As Jonathan Wiener (personal communication) notes, risk trade-off analysis "can be protective of fairness, by ensuring consideration of impacts on all groups, including groups with little political voice." This concern for transparency and consideration of impacts on all groups is also stressed in the concluding passages of the Wingspread statement.
versions of consequentialism. But neither maximization of economic efficiency nor minimization of aggregate risk can ensure that an action or policy is fair. Insofar as the precautionary principle targets the activities of actors whose economic incentives favor inequity, precaution may be justified as an important check on unfair risk transfers.
The precautionary principle targets anthropogenic risks in particular because these are the kinds of risks that generate unfairness. Nonanthropogenic risks may be distributed unevenly, but typically we don't consider such uneven distribution to be unfair, except in an attenuated sense. We might say that it is in some sense unfair that one child has diabetes while his or her sibling does not, but if the diabetes is the result of bad luck in the genetic lottery, then we don't really think of it as unfair, just unfortunate. We ought to do what we can to help the child, but no one has wronged him or her; there is no one to blame for one child having diabetes while the sibling does not. We accept a certain amount of unevenness in the distribution of good and harms as inevitable, and while we feel obligated to aid those who suffer unduly, we don't generally regard our help as a demand of fairness, at least not in the paradigmatic sense. 40 A concern with fairness generates obligations over and above those related to net consequences. By making distributions of some goods (specifically, those goods generated and allocated by humans) and not others (e.g., natural endowments) the subject of moral concern, the treatment of fairness shares in the intuition that causing harm is worse than allowing it. In the case of the precautionary principle, fairness and the doing/allowing distinction suggest that we are more responsible for redistributions of risk that we cause than uneven distributions of risk that we allow. 41 The precautionary principle therefore calls special attention to human activities with the potential to change the distribution of risks to human health and the environment. 42 Moral Agency. The fairness rationale for an emphasis on anthropogenic risk thus ties back into the doing/allowing distinction in an important way. There is also a second, more general rationale for the precautionary principle's focus on anthropogenic risk that involves the fundamental conditions of moral agency. 43 Samuel Scheffler, "Doing and Allowing," Ethics 114 (2004) In a recent article, Samuel Scheffler argues that the doing/allowing distinction is critical to the practice of moral responsibility. Although he acknowledges that the distinction comes in diverse forms, all forms require that we differentiate "cases in which our agency is implicated in a primary way and cases in which it is implicated only secondarily, if at all," 43 and they do so because agency is fundamental in assigning moral responsibility. This view clearly departs from direct consequentialism, since according to direct consequentialism, it doesn't matter who does what, so long as good consequences are maximized.
Scheffler claims that the very basic practice of holding oneself responsible for one's actions depends on the doing/allowing distinction, or something akin to it. To hold oneself responsible, one must hold oneself to certain normative standards and judge one's actions according to whether these standards are met. Doing so involves picking out oneself and one's activities as the objects of judgment, and giving special weight to one's own activities as opposed to those of others, or as opposed to events that merely happen without being caused by any moral agent. In the absence of this special weighting, says Scheffler, we could not truly hold ourselves responsible. The special weighting, however, amounts to invoking some version of the doing/allowing distinction, and in turn, rejecting direct consequentialism. Consequentialism fails to make sense of moral responsibility because as consequentialists we would have to treat all our actions as merely instrumental in the achievement of some kind of overall good: if my harming another would achieve the overall good, then this is what I ought to do. But doing so is in tension with my holding myself responsible, paying particular attention to my own actions as the objects of judgment. As Scheffler explains:
DOING, ALLOWING, AND PRECAUTION
There is an instability in this . . . position, for [it forces a person to think] both that the distinction between primary and secondary manifestations of his [or her] agency is normatively significant and that the distinction is not significant. 44 From the perspective of personal responsibility, explains Scheffler, the distinction matters, but from the perspective of the substantive normative requirements of consequentialism, it does not.
The latter, consequentialist perspective undermines fundamental elements of moral practice. For example, it undermines an individual's ability to object to being harmed by another, making the "right" not to be harmed contingent on questions of overall consequences. It undermines the function of reactive attitudes like moral indignation, instructing us to treat such attitudes as justified only insofar as they optimize overall consequences. Thus, consequentialism entails that it is only appropriate for you to resent someone's cruelty if this resentment serves to increase the aggregate good; resentment per se is not a morally justified response to the experience of cruelty (or even to cruelty that reduces aggregate utility). But holding resentment hostage to its effect on aggregate utility denies the importance of individuals as moral subjects and makes resentment into something alien. One might even argue that if "resentment" is beholden to consequentialist standards, then it is not really resentment anymore; we have changed the subject.
Considerations of fairness and moral agency thus help to explain and justify the precautionary principle's emphasis on human-caused risk. While we can acknowledge the value of reducing risk to human health and the environment generally, we have special reason to take seriously our own contributions to these risks and to hold others particularly responsible for their contributions. The precautionary principle asks proponents of particular activities to give special consideration to the potential harms these activities might cause, and to make an effort to minimize the risks of these harms. This is not to say that we should be unconcerned about nonanthropogenic risks, just that these are not the particular focus of the precautionary principle. The doing/allowing distinction doesn't justify inattention to our allowings; it merely calls special attention to our doings. 45 We need remain vigilant "to the responsibilities of causal position" 46 -which include responsibilities to control nonanthropogenic risks to the environment and human health-while at the same time being especially cognizant of the risks that we generate through our own activities.
INDIRECT CONSEQUENTIALIST JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PRECAUTION IN RELATION TO ANTHROPOGENIC RISKS I have described two deontological justifications for the precautionary principle's weighting of human-caused harms. These justifications rest on the idea that we have greater moral responsibility for courses of events we initiate than those we do not. There are other justifications for distinguishing anthropogenic from nonanthropogenic risks that rest on empirical generalizations about the nature of such risks. Rather than evaluate the consequences of each action or policy decision as a direct consequentialist framework would recommend, we may be able to identify special categories of risks that deserve particular attention because, in general, increased attention to these sorts of risks plays an important role in reducing risk overall.
I mentioned and rejected one such indirect consequentialist justification above, specifically, a justification holding that anthropogenic risks are more controllable than nonanthropogenic ones. Although I argued that this generalization is false, it is true that the introduction of new anthropogenic risks may be easier to control than the introduction of new nonanthropogenic ones, and 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. the precautionary principle targets new anthropogenic risks associated with the introduction of new activities or products. One argument for this idea goes like this: wåhereas we often may be forced to take a reactive stance toward new nonanthropogenic risks-many of which we cannot easily predict-new anthropogenic risks should be more predictable and hence more controllable, and the precautionary principle calls our attention to this fact. For example, one might think that the FDA approval process for new drugs makes it possible to identify in advance many of the risks associated with such products, and that we can control whether we introduce such risks by either allowing or prohibiting a drug from reaching the market. So although not sufficient to fully justify the precautionary principle's emphasis on anthropogenic risk, the idea that new anthropogenic risks are more controllable than new nonanthropogenic risks might provide some support for it.
There is a second rationale that also rests on an empirical generalization, which I call the anthropogenic cascades principle: Environmental changes that humans cause are worse-that is, they have worse effects, or are more dangerous (to humans and to other species)-than nonanthropogenic environmental changes.
If the anthropogenic cascades principle is true, then it gives us reason to take special precautions to avoid anthropogenic risks. In the case of climate change, the anthropogenic cascades principle suggests that in the absence of human intervention, the climate would remain relatively stable, and the planet would remain habitable for humans and the diverse species that currently live on Earth. It is human beings' dangerous meddling that threatens to set off a series of anthropogenic cascades leading to the unraveling of processes that maintain a stable climate. As a general rule or law of nature, the anthropogenic cascades principle is clearly false: sometimes natural environmental changes are catastrophic, and nature is far from stable. In fact, evidence suggests that natural climatic shifts may have played an important role in triggering major extinction events during the Earth's history. 47 Nevertheless, in many cases human "interference" has changed ecological processes at a particularly rapid rate, and rapid changes tend to disrupt ecosystems more than gradual ones: many organisms evolve relatively slowly and can adapt to changes over generations, but cannot easily adjust to radical environmental shifts within their lifetimes. It is also the case that although organisms may be well adapted to certain kinds of dynamic environmental changes-specifically, regular patterns of disturbance (e.g., forest fires, avalanches, flooding) that characterize many ecosystems-human-generated disturbances may deviate from such typical patterns in character, frequency, and scope, presenting novel challenges. So the anthropogenic cascades principle, though far from exceptionless, may be useful as a rule of thumb, and as such, may lend support to the precautionary principle.
VIII. EVALUATING DOING, ALLOWING, AND PRECAUTION I have elaborated two types of rationales for the precautionary principle's emphasis on anthropogenic risk. The first set of rationales rests on the connection between causation and moral responsibility; the second set of rationales rests on empirical generalizations about the nature, consequences, and controllability of human-caused versus natural risks.
Both types of justification require the ability to distinguish anthropogenic from nonanthropogenic risk. The discussion above suggests that as compared to anthropogenic risks, nonanthropogenic risks: (1) are not the primary targets of moral responsibility, (2) do not generate unfairness, (3) are harder to control, and (4) are relatively benign. However, in addition to the problems I have identified with (3) and (4), there is a more systemic difficulty that proponents of the precautionary principle need to address. Specifically, the distinction between anthropogenic and nonanthropogenic risks is growing increasingly difficult to draw as the causal influence of human beings grows. We see intimations of this problem in a passage already quoted above: 48 Tickner, Raffensperger, and Myers, The Precautionary Principle in Action.
[A]n important reason for precaution is that we do not yet know, and may never know, the full extent of the harm caused by human activity. Some violent natural events, for example, may be a result of global warming, which in turn is linked to human activity. 48 Tickner et al. suggest that some natural events may be human caused, which makes the contrast class for "natural" unclear. There is a tension here. On the one hand, the passage suggests that we ought to be extra cautious to prevent harm caused by our activities. But on the other hand, it seems to weaken the distinction between harm caused by our activities and harm caused by natural events by suggesting that our activities may-through complex causal pathways of which we are unaware-cause harmful "natural events." But if the precautionary principle invites us to treat natural events as events we (perhaps) caused and hence for which we are responsible, then it begins to collapse the distinction between anthropogenic and nonanthropogenic risks and harms, moving us toward a position in which we view ourselves as equally responsible for all harms. But this is exactly the sort of position that risk trade-off analysis recommends, and that proponents of the precautionary principle have been inclined to reject.
It seems to me that the precautionary principle-in many, but not all, of its formulations-requires some sort of distinction between anthropogenic and nonanthropogenic risk, between natural baselines and their modification by us. Yet, the idea that there is some kind of natural equilibrial baseline, and that such natural equilibria are good, is under assault. Ecologists have grown critical of traditional views of the "balance of nature" and now emphasize the roles of natural disturbance and dynamism in ecological systems. 49 This emphasis, in conjunction with evidence that apparent "natural baselines" and "background conditions" have been substantially shaped by human beings in the past, 50 calls into question the anthropogenic/nonanthropogenic distinction on which the Wingspread statement seems to rest. If the background distribution of environmental goods and harms is not "natural," but rather caused by us, then why should it not be scrutinized on grounds of fairness? And even if this distribution was not historically under human control, does it not become an issue of fairness and the subject of moral responsibility once we have the capacity to control it, and once we begin to exercise such control?
These issues are not unique to the environmental realm. Similar questions arise in relation to biotechnology. We historically took individuals' genetic endowments as given. However, we have increasing capacity to shape the genetic makeup of individuals, and derivatively, of populations. Once we can use prenatal gene therapy to prevent Type 1 diabetes, for example, can we really cordon off the distribution of genetically-based disease from considerations of fairness? These sorts of questions have been of central concern to bioethicists, some of whom have argued that greater causal power leads to greater causal responsibility, requiring that we redraw the boundaries of fairness, as we move from "chance" to "choice." 51 Some similar redrawing may be needed in relation to environmental risk and harm. I have argued that there are some potentially important reasons for the precautionary principle's distinction between anthropogenic and nonanthropogenic risk. Yet, the distinction between what we cause and what we do not grows blurrier by the year, as human beings increasingly shape flows of nutrients and energy, the composition of the atmosphere, and the distribution of plants and animals on Earth. 52 The precautionary principle calls our attention to important asymmetries between anthropogenic and nonanthropogenic risks, but it does not always clearly articulate the nature and moral significance of these asymmetries, nor does it grapple directly with the challenges posed by the blurring of the distinction between what we do and what we allow. Even in the face of "discordant harmonies," we may have reason to maintain a distinction. For example, insofar as we are able, I believe we ought to distinguish between human-caused extinctions and those not caused by us, and treat the former as morally worse. 53 But in many instances, what we ought to do, and what counts as anthropogenic disturbance is far from clear. Is weed removal an anthropogenic disturbance and a "doing," subject to high standards of precaution, because it involves human action to control plant community composition? Or is it an "allowing," a removal of past human influence that permits the native plants to flourish, and hence deserving of weaker scrutiny? How are we to approach "corrective" or "restorative" actions in cases where "baseline" conditions are the result of past human influence?
These are just a few examples of the difficult questions we face as our causal powers grow. They are questions with which advocates of the precautionary principle and others who want to maintain a distinction between anthropogenic and nonanthropogenic risk will have to grapple. There is something disturbing about the prospect of our deciding what constitutes an "optimal climate" and of controlling our emissions accordingly, and something uncomfortable about valuing smog because it reduces the incidence of skin cancer. But there is also something intuitively sensible about the approach of risk trade-off analysis, which suggests that we attend to all risks, whether target or countervailing. Perhaps some of our discomfort with risk trade-off analysis (if indeed we find it a source of discomfort) arises from the fact that this approach fails to acknowledge the value of the world as we find it. It emphasizes the common sense intuition that we should minimize risk overall, but does so at the expense of the intuition that human-caused harms are worse than naturally-occurring harms. In taking this stance, risk trade-off analysis seems to reject the intuition of many environmentalists that there is something valuable about nature unmanipulated by humans. 54 Instead, it puts the burden upon us to define and quantify risks, and to calculate the best means to minimize them. Risk tradeoff analysis seems to demand too much: it makes us responsible for every facet of the way the world is. The responsibility is weighty, and daunting. I don't know that we should accept it; but as our causal influence continues to grow, it becomes a responsibility increasingly difficult to evade, and increasingly difficult for our traditional moral concepts-of agency, responsibility, and the distinction between doing and allowing-to handle.
